

BOOK LII

Τάδε ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ πεντηκοστῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Δίωνος Ῥωμαϊκῶν·

α. Ὡς Καῖσαρ ἐβουλεύσατο τὴν μοναρχίαν ἀφείναι.

β. Ὡς αὐτοκράτωρ καλεῖσθαι ἤρξατο.

Χρόνου πλῆθος τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς Καίσαρος τὸ ε' καὶ¹ Σέξτου Ἀπουλείου ὑπατείας.²

Ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τε τῇ βασιλείᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ ταῖς τε δυναστείαις, πέντε τε καὶ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑπτακοσίοις ἔτεσι, καὶ ἔπραξαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ ἔπαθον· ἐκ δὲ τούτου μοναρχεῖσθαι αὐτῆς ἀκριβῶς ἤρξαντο, καίτοι τοῦ Καίσαρος βουλευσαμένου τά τε ὄπλα καταθέσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα τῇ τε γερουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ ἐπιτρέψαι.
 2 ἐποιήσατο δὲ τὴν διάγνωσιν μετὰ τε τοῦ Ἀγρίππου καὶ μετὰ τοῦ Μαικήνου (τούτοις γὰρ πάντα τὰ ἀπόρρητα ἀνεκοίνου), καὶ αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀγρίππας πρότερος εἶπε τοιαύδε·
 2 “Μὴ θαυμάσης, ὦ Καῖσαρ, εἰ μέλλω σε ἀποτρέπειν ἀπὸ τῆς μοναρχίας, καίπερ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀπολαύσας ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῆς σοῦ γε αὐτὴν ἔχοντος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ καὶ σοὶ ὠφέλιμος γενήσεται εἰ μέλλει, καὶ πάνυ ἂν αὐτὴν ἐσπούδασα·
 2 ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδὲν ὅμοιον τοῖς τε αὐταρχοῦσι καὶ

¹ καὶ supplied by R. Steph.

² ἀπουλείου ὑπατείας M, om. V.

BOOK LII

The following is contained in the Fifty-second of Dio's Rome:—

How Caesar planned to lay aside his sovereignty (chaps. 1-40).

How he began to be called emperor (chap. 42).

Duration of time, the remainder of the consulship of Caesar (V) and Sextus Apuleius. (B.C. 29.)

Such were the achievements of the Romans and such their sufferings under the kingship, under the republic, and under the dominion of a few, during a period of seven hundred and twenty-five years. After this they reverted to what was, strictly speaking, a monarchy, although Caesar planned to lay down his arms and to entrust the management of the state to the senate and the people. He made his decision, however, in consultation with Agrippa and Maecenas, to whom he was wont to communicate all his secret plans; and Agrippa, taking the lead, spoke as follows:

“Be not surprised, Caesar, if I shall try to turn your thoughts away from monarchy, even though I should derive many advantages from it, at least if it was you who held the position. For if it were to be profitable to you also, I should advocate it most earnestly; but since the privileges of a monarchy

B.C. 29

τοῖς φίλοις σφῶν παρέχεται, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν καὶ ἀνεπιφθόνως καὶ ἀκινδύνως πάνθ' ὅσα ἐθέλουσι καρποῦνται, τοῖς δὲ καὶ φθόνοι καὶ κίνδυνοι συμβαίνουσιν, οὐ τὸ ἑμαντοῦ ἴδιον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν τό τε κοινὸν προιδέσθαι ἐδικαίωσα.

3 “Σκεψώμεθα δὲ καθ' ἡσυχίαν πάντα τὰ προσόντα αὐτῇ, καὶ ὅπη ποτ' ἂν ὁ λογισμὸς ἡμᾶς ἀγάγη τραπώμεθα· οὐ γὰρ πον καὶ ἐξ ἅπαντος τρόπου φήσει τις δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐλέσθαι
4 αὐτήν, κἂν μὴ λυσιτελοῦσα ᾖ. εἰ δὲ μή, δόξομεν¹ ἥτοι τῆς τε εὐπραγίας ἠττήσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κατωρθωμένων ἐκπεφρονηκέναι, ἢ καὶ πάλαι αὐτῆς ἐφιέμενοι τὸν² τε πατέρα καὶ τὴν ἐς αὐτὸν εὐσέβειαν ἐσκήψθαι καὶ τὸν δῆμον τὴν τε γερουσίαν προβεβλήσθαι, οὐχ ἵνα αὐτοὺς τῶν ἐπιβουλεσάντων σφίσιν ἀπαλλάξωμεν, ἀλλ' ἵνα
5 ἑαυτοῖς δουλωσώμεθα. ἐκάτερον δὲ ὑπαίτιον. τίς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν³ ἀγανακτήσειεν ἄλλα μὲν ὁρῶν ἡμᾶς εἰρηκότας, ἄλλα δὲ αἰσθανόμενος πεφρονηκότας; πῶς δ' οὐκ ἂν μᾶλλον νῦν μισήσειεν ἡμᾶς ἢ εἰ κατ' ἀρχὰς εὐθύς τὴν τε ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπεγυμνώσαμεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν μοναρχίαν ἀντικρυς
6 ὠρμήσαμεν; τὸ μὲν γὰρ βίαιόν τι τολμᾶν προσήκειν πῶς τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει, κἂν πλεονεκτικὸν εἶναι δοκῇ, πεπίστευται· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ προφέρων ἐν τινι πλέον ἀξιῶ τοῦ καταδεεστέρου ἔχειν, καὶ κατορθώσας τέ τι ἐς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς⁴

¹ δόξομεν R. Steph., δόξωμεν VM.

² τὸν M, τὸ V.

³ ἂν supplied by St.

⁴ ψυχῆς Rk., τύχης VM.

are by no means the same for the rulers as for their friends, but, on the contrary, jealousies and dangers fall to the lot of the rulers while their friends reap, without incurring either jealousies or dangers, all the benefits they can wish for, I have thought it right, in this question as in all others, to have regard, not for my own interests, but for yours and the state's.

“Let us consider, now, at our leisure all the characteristics of this system of government and then shape our course in whichever direction our reasoning may lead us. For surely no one will assert that we are obliged to choose monarchy in any and all circumstances, even if it be not profitable. If we choose it, people will think that we have fallen victims to our own good fortune and have been bereft of our senses by our successes, or else that we have been aiming at sovereignty all the while, making of our appeals to your father and of our devotion to his memory a mere pretext and using the people and the senate as a cloak, with the purpose, not of freeing these latter from those who plotted against them, but of making them slaves to ourselves. And either explanation involves censure for us. For who could help being indignant when he finds that we have said one thing and then discovers that we have meant another? Would he not hate us much more now than if we had at the outset laid bare our desires and set out directly for the monarchy? To be sure, men have come to believe that it somehow is an attribute of human nature, however selfish that may seem, to resort to deeds of violence; for every one who excels in any respect thinks it right that he should have more than his inferior, and if he meets with any success, he ascribes his success to the force

B.C. 26

ἰσχὺν ἀναφέρεται, καὶ διαμαρτῶν τινος τῆ τοῦ
 7 δαιμονίου φορᾶ προστίθεται. ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς
 καὶ κακουργίας τοιοῦτό τι ποιῶν πρῶτον μὲν
 δολερὸς καὶ σκολιὸς καὶ κακοήθης καὶ κακό-
 τροπος εἶναι νομίζεται, ἅπερ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι περὶ
 σοῦ οὐδένα ἂν ὑπομείνεις εἰπεῖν ἢ φρονῆσαι,
 οὐδ' εἰ πάσης ἐκ τούτου τῆς οἰκουμένης ἄρχειας·
 ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ κατορθώσας ἄδικον τὴν πλεονεξίαν
 πεποιῆσθαι καὶ σφαλῆς δικαίαν τὴν κακοπραγίαν
 3 εἰληφέναι δοκεῖ. τούτου δὲ δὴ οὕτως ἔχοντος,
 οὐδὲν ἂν ἦττον ἐπικαλέσειέ τις ἡμῖν καὶ εἰ μηδὲν
 τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ πρώτης ἐνθυμηθέντες ἔπειτα νῦν
 ἐπιθυμήσαιμεν αὐτοῦ. τὸ γὰρ τοι τῶν τε παρόν-
 των νικᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑαυτοὺς κατέχειν τοῖς τε
 παρὰ τῆς τύχης δοθείσι μὴ καλῶς χρῆσθαι πολὺ
 2 χεῖρόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐκ κακοπραγίας ἀδικεῖν τινα· οἱ
 μὲν γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν συμφορῶν πολλακίς
 ἀναγκάζονται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντός σφισσι
 χρεῖαν καὶ ἄκοντες πλημμελεῖν, οἱ δ' ἐβελονταὶ
 ἀκράτορες ἑαυτῶν καὶ παρὰ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν γί-
 γνουται. τοὺς δὲ δὴ μὴθ' ἀπλότητά τινα ἐν τῇ
 ψυχῇ ἔχοντας μήτε τὰ δοθέντα σφίσιν ἀγαθὰ
 μετριάσαι δυναμένους πῶς ἂν τις προσδοκῆσειεν
 ἦτοι τῶν ἄλλων καλῶς ἡγεμονεύσειν ἢ ταῖς
 3 συμφοραῖς ὀρθῶς χρῆσεσθαι; ὡς οὖν μηδέτερον
 αὐτῶν πεπονηότες, μηδ' ἀλόγως τι πράξει ἐπι-
 θυμοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ποτ' ἂν βουλευσαμένοις ἡμῖν
 ἄριστον φανῆ τοῦθ' αἰρησόμενοι, τὴν διάγνωσιν

of his own intelligence, whereas if he fails, he lays B.C. 29
 the blame for his failure upon the influence of the
 divine will. But, on the other hand, the man who,
 in following such a course, resorts to plotting and
 villainy, is, in the first place, held to be crafty and
 crooked, malicious, and depraved,—an opinion which
 I know you would not allow anyone to express or to
 entertain about you, even if you might rule the
 whole world by such practices; and, in the second
 place, if he succeeds, men think that the advantage
 he has gained is unjust, or if he fails, that his dis-
 comfiture is merited. This being the case, men
 would reproach us quite as much if we should now,
 after the event, begin to covet that advantage, even
 though we harboured no such intention at the outset.
 For surely it is much worse for men to let circum-
 stances get the better of them and not only to fail
 to hold themselves in check but to abuse the gifts of
 Fortune, than to wrong others in consequence of
 failure. For men who have failed are often compelled
 by their very misfortunes to commit wrongs even
 against their will in order to meet the demands of
 their own interests, whereas the others voluntarily
 abandon their self-control even when it is unprofitable
 to do so. And when men have no straightforwardness
 in their souls, and are incapable of moderation in
 dealing with the blessings bestowed upon them, how
 could one expect them either to rule well over others
 or to conduct themselves properly in adversity? In
 the conviction, therefore, that we are guilty of
 neither of these shortcomings, and that we have no
 desire to act irrationally, but that we shall choose
 whatever course shall appear to us after deliberation
 to be best, let us proceed to make our decision

αὐτοῦ ποιησώμεθα. λέξω δὲ μετὰ παρρησίας· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸς ἄλλως ἂν τι εἰπεῖν δυναίμην, οὔτε σοὶ σύννοια τὰ ψευδῆ μετὰ κολακείας ἠδέως ἀκούοντι.

- 4 “Ἡ μὲν τοίνυν ἰσονομία τό τε πρόσρημα εὐώνυμον καὶ τὸ ἔργον δικαιοτάτον ἔχει. τῆν γὰρ φύσιν τὴν αὐτὴν τινὰς εἰληχότας καὶ ὁμοφύλους ἀλλήλοις ὄντας, ἔν τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἤθεσι τεθραμμένους καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις πεπαι-
- 2 δευμένους, καὶ κοινὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν χρῆσιν τῇ πατρίδι παρέχοντας, πῶς μὲν οὐ δίκαιον καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα κοινοῦσθαι, πῶς δ’ οὐκ ἄριστον ἐν μηδεὶ πλὴν ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς
- 3 προτιμάσθαι; ἢ τε γὰρ ἰσογονία ἰσομοιρίας ὀριγνάται, καὶ τυχοῦσα μὲν αὐτῆς χαίρει, διαμαρτούσα δὲ ἄχθεται· καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον πᾶν, ἅτε ἐκ τε θεῶν γεγονὸς καὶ ἐς θεοὺς ἀφῆξον, ἄνω βλέπει, καὶ οὔτε ἐθέλει ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ διὰ παντὸς
- 4 ἄρχεσθαι, οὔθ’ ὑπομένει τῶν μὲν πόνων καὶ τῶν κινδύνων τῶν τε δαπανημάτων μετέχον, τῆς δὲ κοινωνίας τῶν κρειπτόνων στερόμενον, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀναγκασθῆ τι τοιοῦτον ὑποστῆναι, μισεῖ τὸ βεβιασμένον, κἂν καιροῦ λάβηται, τιμωρεῖται τὸ μεμισημένον. ἄρχειν τε γὰρ πάντες ἀξιοῦσι, καὶ
- 5 διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἐν τῷ μέρει ὑπομένονσι· καὶ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλουσι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀναγκάζονται. ταῖς τε τιμαῖς ταῖς παρὰ τῶν ὁμοτίμων χαίρουσι, καὶ
- 6 τὰς τιμωρίας τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπαινοῦσι. κἂν οὕτω πολλεῦνται, κοινὰ¹ μὲν τὰ ἀγαθὰ κοινὰ

¹ κοινὰ Rk., καὶ κοινὰ VM.

accordingly. I shall speak quite frankly, for I could not, for my part, speak otherwise, and I know you too well to think that you like to listen to falsehood mingled with flattery. B.C. 29

“Equality before the law has an auspicious name and is most just in its workings. For in the case of men who are endowed with the same nature, are of the same race with one another, have been brought up under the same institutions, have been trained in laws that are alike, and yield in an equal degree the service of their bodies and of their minds to their country, is it not just that they should have an equal share in all other things also, and is it not best that they should secure no distinctions except as the result of excellence? For equality of birth demands equality of privilege, and if it attains this object, it is glad, but if it fails, it is displeased. And the human race everywhere, sprung as it is from the gods and destined to return to the gods, gazes upward and is not content to be ruled forever by the same person, nor will it endure to share in the toils, the dangers, and the expenditures and yet be deprived of partnership in the better things. Or, if it is forced to submit to anything of the sort, it hates the power which has applied coercion, and if it obtains an opportunity, takes vengeance upon what it hates. All men, of course, claim the right to rule, and for this reason submit to being ruled in turn; they are unwilling to have others overreach them, and therefore are not obliged, on their part, to overreach others. They are pleased with the honours bestowed upon them by their equals, and approve of the penalties inflicted upon them by the laws. Now if they live under this kind of polity and regard the blessings and also the

- δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία νομίζοντες εἶναι, οὔτε τι κακὸν οὐδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν γίγνεσθαι βούλονται, καὶ πάντα τὰ κρείττω πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς συνεύχονται.
- 7 καὶ ἂν τε τις αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν τινα ἔχη, καὶ προφαίνει αὐτὴν προχείρως καὶ ἀσκέει προθύμως καὶ ἐπιδείκνυσιν ἀσμενέστατα, ἂν τε καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἴδῃ, καὶ προάγει ἐτοίμως καὶ συναύξει σπουδαίως
- 8 καὶ τιμᾷ λαμπρότατα. καὶ μέντοι κἂν κακύνηται τις, πᾶς αὐτὸν μισεῖ, κἂν δυστυχῇ, πᾶς ἐλεεῖ, κοινῇ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν ζημίαν καὶ τὴν αἰσχύνῃ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν εἶναι νομίζων.
- 5 “ Αὕτη μὲν ἡ τῶν δῆμων κατάστασις, ἐν δὲ δὴ ταῖς τυραννίσιν πάντα τὰναντία συμβαίνει. καὶ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ τί δεῖ μηκύνειν λέγοντα; τὸ δὲ δὴ κεφάλαιον, χρηστὸν μὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν οὔτ' εἰδέναι οὔτ' ἔχειν δοκεῖν βούλεται (πολέμιον γὰρ αὐτῷ πᾶν ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ κρατοῦν ὡς πλήθει γίγνεται),
- 2 τὸν δὲ ἐκείνου τις τρόπον κανόνα τοῦ βίου ποιησάμενος, ὃ τι ποτ' ἂν ἐλπίσῃ δι' αὐτοῦ πλεονεκτήσας ἀκινδύνως κερδανεῖν, μετέρχεται. καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' οἱ πλείους σφῶν τό τε καθ' ἑαυτοὺς¹ μόνον σπεύδουσι καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους μισοῦσι, τὰς τε εὐπραγίας αὐτῶν οἰκείας ζημίας καὶ τὰς συμφορὰς ἴδια κέρδη ποιούμενοι.
- 3 “ Τοιούτων δὲ δὴ τούτων ὄντων οὐχ ὀρῶ τί ποτ' ἂν εἰκότως ἐπάρειέ σε μοναρχῆσαι ἐπιθυμησάσαι. πρὸς γὰρ τῷ τοῖς δήμοις χαλεπὸν εἶναι τὸ πολίτευμα, πολὺ δυσχερέστερον αὐτῷ σοι γένοιτο ἂν.

¹ At this point a quaternion (containing the chapters down to 20, 4) is missing from M. L', the copy of M, here becomes of importance, since the scribe filled the lacuna in M from L, which was then complete. See vol. i. p. xxv.

opposite as belonging to all alike, they not only wish no harm to befall any one of the citizens, but devoutly hope that nothing but prosperity will fall to the lot of each and all. And if one of them possesses any excellence himself, he readily makes it known, practises it enthusiastically, and exhibits it most joyfully; or if he sees it in another, he readily brings it to the light, eagerly takes part in increasing it, and bestows the most splendid honours upon it. On the other hand, if any one shows himself base, everybody hates him, and if any one meets with misfortune, everybody pities him; for each person regards the loss and the disgrace that arise therefrom as shared in by the whole state.

“This is the character of democracies. Under tyrannies exactly the opposite conditions are found. But why go into all the details at length? The chief thing is that no one is willing to be thought to have any superior knowledge or possession, because the dominant power generally becomes wholly hostile to him on account of such superiority; on the contrary, every one makes the tyrant's character his own standard of life and pursues whatever objects he may hope to gain through him by overreaching others without personal risk. Consequently, the majority of the people are devoted only to their own interests and hate all their neighbours, regarding the others' successes as their own losses and the others' misfortunes as their own gains.

“Such being the state of the case, I do not see what motive could reasonably induce you to desire to become sole ruler. For that system, besides being difficult to apply to democracies, would be vastly more difficult still for you yourself to put into effect.

ἢ οὐχ ὄρας ὅπως ἢ τε πόλις καὶ τὰ πράγματα.
 4 αὐτῆς ἔτι καὶ νῦν ταράττεται; καὶ χαλεπὸν μὲν
 ἔστι τὸ τὸν ὄμιλον ἡμῶν, τοσοῦτοις ἔτεσιν ἐν
 ἐλευθερίᾳ βεβιωκότα, καταλύσαι, χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ
 τὸ τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς τε ὑπηκόους, τοὺς μὲν
 ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ δημοκρατουμένους τοὺς δ' ὑφ' ἡμῶν
 αὐτῶν ἠλευθερωμένους, ἐς δουλείαν αὐθις κατα-
 στήσαι, τοσοῦτων περίξ πολεμίων ἡμῖν προσ-
 κειμένων.

6 “Καὶ ἵνα γε ἀπὸ πρώτου τοῦ βραχυτάτου
 ἄρξωμαι, χρήματά σοι πολλὰ καὶ πανταχόθεν
 ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται πορίζειν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὰς νῦν
 οὔσας προσόδους πρὸς τε τᾶλλα καὶ πρὸς τὴν
 τῶν στρατιωτῶν τροφήν ἐξαρκέσαι. τοῦτο δὲ
 ἔστι μὲν καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε
 2 πολιτείαν τινὰ ἄνευ δαπάνης συστήναι. ἀλλ' ἐν
 μὲν ἐκείναις μάλιστα μὲν ἐκόντες πολλοὶ πολλὰ
 ἐπιδιδόασιν, ἐν φιλοτιμίας μέρει τὸ πρᾶγμα
 ποιούμενοι καὶ τιμὰς ἀντ' αὐτῶν ἀξίας ἀντι-
 λαμβάνοντες· ἂν δέ που καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι παρὰ
 πάντων ἐσφοραὶ γένωνται, ἑαυτοῦς τε¹ πείθοντες
 3 καὶ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν συντελοῦντες ἀνέχονται. ἐν δὲ
 δὴ ταῖς δυναστείαις τό τε ἄρχον πάντες μόνον ὡς
 καὶ ὑπερπλουτοῦν ἀξιούσι δαπανᾶσθαι, τὰς μὲν
 προσόδους αὐτοῦ ἐτοίμως ἐξερευνώμενοι, τὰ δ'
 ἀναλώματα οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως ἐκλογιζόμενοι· καὶ οὔτ'
 ἰδίᾳ ἠδέως ἢ καὶ ἐκόντες ἐπιδιδόασι τι, οὔτε τὰς

¹ τε R. Steph., γε VL'.

Or do you not see how the city and its affairs are even now in a state of turmoil? It is difficult, also, to overthrow our populace, which has lived for so many years in freedom, and difficult, when so many enemies beset us round about, to reduce again to slavery the allies and subject nations, some of which have had a democratic government from of old, while others of them have been set free by us ourselves.

“To begin first with the least important consideration, it will be necessary that you procure a large supply of money from all sides; for it is impossible that our present revenues should suffice for the support of the troops, not to speak of the other expenses. Now this need of funds, to be sure, exists in democracies also, since it is not possible for any government to continue without expense. But in democracies many citizens make large contributions, preferably of their own free will, in addition to what is required of them, making it a matter of patriotic emulation and securing appropriate honours in return for their liberality; or, if perchance compulsory levies are also made upon the whole body of citizens, they submit to it both because it is done with their own consent and because the contributions they make are in their own interests. In monarchical governments, on the other hand, the citizens all think that the ruling power alone, to which they credit boundless wealth, should bear the expense; for they are very ready to search out the ruler's sources of income, but do not reckon his expenses so carefully; and so they make no contributions from their private means gladly or of their own free will, nor are the public levies they make

4 κοινὰς συντελείας αὐθαιρέτους ποιοῦνται. ἐκείνο μὲν γὰρ οὐτ' ἂν ἐθελήσειέ τις (οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ὁμολογήσειεν ἂν ῥαδίως πλουτεῖν) οὔτε συμφέρει τῷ κρατοῦντι γίνεσθαι· αὐτίκα γὰρ ἂν δόξαν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὡς καὶ φιλόπολις ἔχων ὀγκωθεῖη καὶ νεωτερίσειε. τὸ δ' ἕτερον πάντοὺς πολλοὺς βαρύνει, καὶ μάλιστα¹ ὅτι τὴν μὲν ζῆμίαν αὐτοὶ ὑπομένουσι, τὸ δὲ δὴ κέρδος ἕτεροι

5 λαμβάνουσιν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ στρατεύονται ὡς πλήθει οἱ τὰ χρήματα συνεσφέροντες, ὥστε τρόπον τινα αὐθις αὐτὰ ἀπολαμβάνουσιν· ἐν δὲ ταῖς μοναρχίαις ἄλλοι μὲν ὡς τὸ πολὺ καὶ γεωργοῦσι καὶ δημιουργοῦσι καὶ ναυτίλλονται καὶ πολιτεύονται, παρ' ὧν περ καὶ αἱ λήψεις μάλιστα γίνονται, ἄλλοι δὲ τὰ ὄπλα ἔχουσι καὶ τὸν μισθὸν φέρουσιν.

7 “Ἐν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοιοῦτον ὃν πράγματά σοι παρέξει, ἕτερον δὲ ἐκείνο. πάντως μὲν τινα δεῖ δίκην τὸν αἰεὶ κακουργοῦντα διδόναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ νοθεσίας οὔτε ἐκ παραδειγμάτων οἱ πολλοὶ σφραγίζονται, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη πᾶσα αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀτιμία καὶ φυγὴ καὶ θανάτῳ ζημιοῦσθαι, οἷα ἐν τε ἀρχῇ τηλικαύτῃ καὶ ἐν πλήθει ἀνθρώπων τοσοῦτῳ,¹ ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν μεταβολῇ πολιτείας,

2 φιλεῖ συμβαίνειν. τούτοις² δ' ἂν μὲν ἐτέρους δικαστὰς καθίξῃς, ἀπολύοιτό τε ἂν διασπενδόμενοι, καὶ μάλιστα ὅσους ἂν ἐχθραίνειν νομισθῆς· καὶ γὰρ προσποίησίν τινα ἐξουσίας οἱ δικάζοντες λαμβάνουσιν, ὅταν τι παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ

3 κρατοῦντι ποιήσωσι· κἂν ἄρα τινὲς ἀλίσκωνται,³

¹ τοσοῦτῳ St., τοσοῦτων VL'. ² τούτοις Xyl., ταύτους VL'.

³ ἀλίσκωνται R. Steph., ἀλίσκωνται VL'.

voted of their own free choice. As for the voluntary B.C. 29 contributions, no citizen would feel free to make one, any more than he would readily admit that he was rich, and it is not to the advantage of the ruler that he should, for immediately he would acquire a reputation for patriotism among the masses, become conceited, and incite a rebellion. On the other hand, a general levy weighs heavily upon the masses, the more so because they suffer the loss while the others reap the gain. Now in democracies those who contribute the money as a general rule also serve in the army, so that in a way they get their money back again; but in monarchies one set of people usually engages in agriculture, manufacturing, commerce, and politics,—and these are the classes from which the state's receipts are chiefly derived,—and a different set is under arms and draws pay.

“This single circumstance, then, which is as I have described it, will cause you trouble. But here is another. It is by all means essential that whoever from time to time commits a crime should pay some penalty. For the majority of men are not brought to reason by admonition or by example, but it is absolutely necessary to punish them by disfranchisement, by exile, or by death; and such punishments are often administered in an empire as large as this is and in a population as great as ours, especially during a change of government. Now if you appointed other men to judge these wrongdoers, they would vie with each other in acquitting the accused, and particularly all whom you might be thought to hate; for judges, you know, gain an appearance of authority when they act in any way contrary to the wish of the ruler. And if an

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